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ABSTRACT 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) play a key role in promoting the production of 
environmental public goods by European Union agriculture. Although extensive literature has 
analyzed AES, some important issues remain understudied. This paper performs an ex-ante 
assessment of AES in permanent cropping, analyzing several issues that have received little 
attention from researchers, such as ecological focus areas (EFA) and collective participation. 
For this purpose, a choice experiment was used to assess farmers’ preferences toward AES in 
a case study of olive groves in southern Spain. Results show high heterogeneity among 
farmers, with different classes being identified, from potential participants to non-participants. 
As regards EFA, almost half of the farmers would be willing to accept it for low monetary 
incentives (€8-9/ha per additional 1% of the farmland devoted to EFA) while the rest would 
do it for moderate-to-high monetary incentives (€41-151/ha per additional 1% of EFA). 
However, for a high share of EFA (e.g., 5-7%) higher incentives would presumably be 
required due to the intrinsic spatial restrictions of olive groves. With regard to collective 
participation, we find that it is unlikely that farmers would participate collectively with the 
incentive of the up-to-30% EU-wide bonus. These results are relevant for policy-making now 
when new AES are being designed for the next programming period 2014-2020. 
 
KEYWORDS: Environmental public goods; Agri-environmental Schemes; Olive groves; 
Collective participation; Ecological focus areas; Choice experiment. 
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THE DESIGN OF AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEMES: 
FARMERS’ PREFERENCES IN SOUTHERN SPAIN 
 
1. Introduction 
The provision of public goods by agriculture is a relevant objective shared by most of the 
agricultural policies of developed countries (OECD, 2008). This objective has gained 
relevance throughout time because of society’s increasing demands for such goods. However, 
the design of efficient tools oriented to achieve this objective represents a daunting challenge 
for policy-making. In particular, policy-makers have to take account of the type of joint 
production (of private and public goods) and farmers’ preferences and circumstances to 
design tools that effectively promote agricultural public goods production without distorting 
commodity markets (OECD, 2001; Cooper et al., 2009). Yet, analyses are still required to 
support public decision-making regarding the design of such tools (Hart et al., 2011; OECD, 
2013). 
Among tools to promote the provision of public goods by agriculture, voluntary 
incentive-based payments aimed at compensating the farmer for the rent forgone derived from 
the use of related non-productive agricultural practices are a suitable option (OECD, 2001; 
Hart et al., 2011; Hodge, 2013). These are no (or little) distorting tools (i.e., part of the Green 
Box of World Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture) specifically targeted to the 
production of agricultural public goods. A paradigmatic case of this type of tools are the agri-
environmental schemes (AES) of the European Union’s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). AES are multiannual and voluntary incentive-based payments to farmers for 
preserving and enhancing environmental public goods. They usually consist of a per-hectare 
payment implemented regionally and co-financed by the EU and each of its Member States 
(Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). AES stand out as one of the most 
significant CAP tools as they have assigned an aggregated expenditure of 22.2 billion euro 
(that is, 22% of the budget of the European Rural Development Policy 2007-2013, according 
to ECA, 2011). Thus, the implementation of AES is a good proof of how the objective of 
encouraging public goods provision has become a key concept for the design of the CAP (EC, 
2010a). 
Not surprisingly, AES have been the subject of much attention by researchers (Uthes 
and Matzdorf, 2013). Their work has focused mainly on the barriers to participation in such 
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schemes (Falconer, 2000; Christensen et al., 2011; Broch and Vedel, 2012), and on improving 
their design (Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010). However, more in-depth 
knowledge is still needed regarding some important issues such as farmers’ willingness to 
accept (WTA) for AES participation in agricultural systems made up of permanent crops, the 
inclusion of ecological focus areas (EFA) and collective participation in such schemes. 
With regard to the first issue, it is worth pointing out that ex-ante analyses of farmers’ 
WTA for AES enrollment in permanent cropping systems are lacking in the literature. While 
AES in these agricultural systems have been previously studied (Calatrava-Leyva et al., 2007; 
Duarte et al., 2008; Fleskens and de Graaff, 2010; Franco, 2011), to the authors’ knowledge 
none of these works have focused on the ex-ante assessments of farmers’ WTA for AES 
participation, though this is not the case for herbaceous cropping systems (Christensen et al., 
2011; Broch and Vedel, 2012). Ex-ante analyses of farmers’ WTA for AES participation in 
permanent crops are opportune now since new AES are being designed for the next 
programming period, 2014-2020. This is particularly true for the case of olive groves in 
southern Spain, considering not only their high socioeconomic relevance, but also the 
numerous environmental problems that have emerged as a consequence of the expansion and 
intensification process that olive growing has undergone over the last two decades (Gómez-
Limón and Arriaza, 2011). Specifically, these negative environmental impacts are soil 
erosion, biodiversity loss, overexploitation of water resources, non-point water pollution and 
deterioration of traditional landscapes (Beaufoy and Pienkowski, 2000; Gómez, 2009). Recent 
studies highlight that there is great scope for improvement in the production of environmental 
public goods by olive growing (Carmona-Torres et al., 2014; Villanueva et al., 2014). These 
studies identify soil conservation practices as one of the most important environmental-
friendly practices to be adopted by olive growers, especially the use of cover crops (CC). CC 
are spontaneous or cultivated plants that grow between tree lines with the main objective of 
soil protection (Gómez, 2009). Apart from soil conservation, the use of CC has additional 
positive environmental impacts on soil carbon sequestration (González-Sánchez et al., 2012), 
biodiversity (Rey, 2011), visual quality of landscapes (Arriaza et al., 2004) and water 
pollution (Castro et al., 2008). Although there are studies that analyze the adoption of CC 
(Franco, 2011; Rodríguez-Entrena and Arriaza, 2013), to our best knowledge there are no 
other studies estimating farmers’ WTA for CC within AES. 
Apart from the agricultural system, the second issue that has received limited attention 
in the literature about AES is the promotion of EFA in farmland. EFA is defined in CAP 
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regulations as areas with landscape features, terraces, buffer strips, land lying fallow, 
afforested areas and agro-forestry areas, or areas with a reduced use of inputs on the farm, 
such as those covered by catch crops and winter green cover. The presence of EFA generally 
improves biodiversity, as well as other public goods such as visual quality of landscapes, soil 
conservation, and so on (Stoate et al., 2009; EC, 2011a). This is the main reason that led to 
the European Commission (EC, 2011b) proposing a new instrument in the CAP 2014-2020, 
known as green payment, for those farms fulfilling some basic environmental requirements, 
including dedicating 7% of their farmland to EFA. However, this particular requirement was 
later relaxed as a result of the political debate and in the final regulation (Regulation 
1307/2013, Art. 43-47) the share of EFA was set at 5%, compulsory for arable land only 
(permanent crops are eligible for this payment without any minimum EFA requisite). 
Therefore, this research aims at exploring in advance the olive growers’ behavior regarding 
the implementation of EFA in their farmland. This is carried out by means of considering the 
inclusion of EFA in AES as a possible transitional period on the way to a hypothetical future 
implementation of EFA as a requisite for being eligible for the green payment in permanent 
crops. 
The third issue to receive scarce attention in the literature is collective participation in 
AES, understood as farmers collectively signing AES contracts. It represents a promising way 
of reducing public transaction costs (costs of the resources spent by the Administration in 
providing information about the AES, subscribing contracts, monitoring implementation and 
making payments) while increasing the environmental effectiveness of policy tools. 
Specifically, spreading out the collective participation in AES reduces the number of 
applications to be processed as well as the costs of monitoring, consequently reducing 
transaction costs incurred by the government (Franks, 2011; Emery and Franks, 2012). 
Moreover, if the collective participation in AES is implemented in such a way that ensures the 
proximity of the farms that form the collective, a greater environmental effect would also be 
expected (Sutherland et al., 2012). Focusing on olive growing agricultural systems, it is worth 
quoting a recent work carried out by Rocamora-Montiel et al. (2014) who have explored the 
potential of territorial contracts in mountainous olive production systems in southern Spain as 
a tool to increase the farmers’ profitability by adopting organic farming. This work represents 
a precedent of the current research since it reflects the interest for collective contracts in 
permanent cropping systems, in particular in olive growing. Despite the relevance of this 
topic, to the authors’ knowledge, there is no paper that quantitatively analyzes farmers’ 
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willingness to participate in AES collectively, neither in olive growing nor in any other 
agricultural system. 
In this paper, we use the choice experiment method to analyze southern Spain’s olive 
growers’ preferences toward AES including the above-mentioned innovative issues. The main 
objectives of this analysis are to support the design of new AES aimed at promoting public 
goods production by olive growing, and to partially bridge the existing knowledge gaps about 
the inclusion of CC, EFA and collective participation in AES contracts. Therefore, the results 
of this analysis may be very useful for policy-making, particularly now when new AES are 
being designed for the next programming period, 2014-2020. For this purpose, the paper is 
structured as follows. The next section is devoted to the description of the method and the 
data gathering used for the empirical analysis. The main results are presented in the third 
section and discussed in the fourth, where the main policy implications are also outlined. 
Finally, in the fifth section some conclusions are highlighted. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Choice experiment approach 
Choice experiment (CE) is a stated preference valuation technique based on Lancasterian 
Consumer Theory of utility maximization which postulates that consumption decisions are 
determined by the utility or value derived from the attributes of the good being consumed 
(Lancaster, 1966). The econometric basis of the approach lies in the Random Utility Theory 
(McFadden, 1974)1. CE is well suited to measuring the marginal value of the attributes of a 
good or a policy instrument (Ruto and Garrod, 2009), with the underlying assumption being 
that farmers’ choices among voluntary policy schemes depend on the specific characteristics -
attributes- of these schemes (Christensen et al., 2011). In fact, the use of this approach to 
support policy-making has sharply increased in the last five years, especially in regard to AES 
design. Noteworthy studies that use CE to analyze AES include Ruto and Garrod (2009), who 
study EU farmers’ preferences toward design attributes of AES; Espinosa-Goded et al. 
(2010), who analyze the adoption of AES in specific extensive herbaceous agri-systems in 
Spain; Christensen et al. (2011), who study Danish farmers’ willingness to participate in 
pesticide reduction AES; and Broch and Vedel (2012), who analyze Danish farmers’ 
willingness to participate in afforestation AES. Also, it is worth remarking on the work of 
1 For an extensive explanation of the choice experiment theory and practice, see Hensher et al. (2005). 
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Schulz et al. (2014), which analyzes German farmers’ willingness to accept green payments. 
All these examples support the choice of CE as the approach taken for this empirical study. 
2.2. Case study, attributes and levels 
The case study selected for the analysis is olive growing in Andalusia (southern Spain), given 
that this is the main crop grown in this region (over 1.5 million hectares, 48% of Andalusian 
farmland) and has great potential for improvement in the production of environmental public 
goods. According to Villanueva et al. (2014), soil fertility, visual quality of the landscape, 
biodiversity and mitigation of climate change are the four public goods presenting the highest 
enhancement potential from a supply point of view. Moreover, all of these public goods are in 
high demand by European (EC, 2010b) and Andalusian (Salazar-Ordóñez et al., 2013; 
Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2014b) societies. Thus, it is reasonable that any AES for olive 
growing in Andalusia should focus on agronomic practices aimed at increasing the provision 
of these public goods. For this reason, three of the attributes considered for the 
implementation of the CE are linked with agricultural management; two of them related to the 
use of CC and one to EFA. 
Regarding CC, Villanueva et al. (2014) find that it possibly represents the most useful 
agricultural practice in olive growing in terms of enhancing the production of environmental 
public goods. In any case, the level of production of these public goods derived from the use 
of CC in this agricultural system depends on the area covered and how farmers manage these 
CC (Barranco et al., 2008). Accordingly, the area covered by CC and their management are 
the two related attributes included in the CE. For the attribute Cover crops area (CCAR), two 
levels were set: 25% and 50% of the olive grove area (CCAR-25% and CCAR-50%, 
respectively) (see Table 1). In both cases CC are supposed to be maintained (at least) from 
October to mid-March every year. As regards the attribute Cover crops management 
(CCMA), two levels were also set: free (CCMA-Free) and restrictive management (CCMA-
Restr). The latter corresponds to the management established in the current AES specifically 
devoted to olive growing (Sub-measure 7 or SM72), that basically restricts the use of both 
tillage and herbicide in CC management, while the former implies no further restrictions than 
those that are part of cross-compliance. 
2 SM7 was an AES implemented for olive growing in the Andalusian Rural Development Program 2007-2013, targeted at 
integrated farming in olive groves located in Natura 2000 areas or watersheds of reservoirs for urban water supply. 
Participation in this scheme involved the use of CC from November (when the rainy season begins) to mid-March (when the 
CC start to compete with olive trees for soil water). SM7 payments were linked to the strip width of the CC, €204/ha and 
€286/ha per year for strips 1.8 and 3.6m wide, respectively. As regards its management, soil tillage was not allowed (except 
for sowing cultivated CC) and the use of herbicides was restricted to twice every five years (but never twice in a single year). 
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For the attribute Ecological focus areas (EFA), levels were set at 0 and 2% of the 
olive grove plots covered by EFA (EFA-0% and EFA-2%, respectively). The first level is 
equivalent to the requirement included in green payment for permanent crops. The second is 
substantially below the 5% of EFA finally established for arable lands in the new CAP and 
was decided upon after taking into account both the current lack of these kinds of areas in 
Andalusian olive groves and the difficulties of increasing the share of EFA in permanent 
crops (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011). In any case, it can be assumed that the proposed 2% 
of EFA could effectively entail environmental improvement by creating new buffer strips, 
vegetation boundaries and islets or maintaining some olive trees out of production (the latter 
being equivalent to land lying fallow). 
Table 1. Attributes and levels used in the choice set designµ. 
Attribute [Acronym] Explanation Levels 
Cover crops area [CCAR] Percentage of the olive grove area covered by cover crops 25 and 50% 
Cover crops management 
[CCMA] Farmer’s management of the cover crops Free and restrictive management 
Ecological focus areas 
[EFA] 
Percentage of the olive grove plots covered 
by ecological focus areas 0 and 2% 
Collective participation 
[COLLE] 
Participation of a group of farmers (at least 5) 
with farms located in the same municipality 
Individual and collective 
participation 
Monitoring [MONI] Percentage of farms monitored each year 5 and 20% 
Payment [PAYM] Yearly payment per ha for a 5-year AES contract 
€100, 200, 300 and 400/ha per 
year 
µ The status quo level considered is the farmer’s initial condition for CCAR, CCMA, and EFA, COLLE=Individual, 
MONI=5%, and zero PAYM. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
In addition to the above-mentioned agronomic attributes, the CE implemented also 
includes two policy design attributes: collective participation and level of monitoring. For 
Collective participation (COLLE), the two established levels are straightforward, that is, 
collective and individual participation. However, a precise definition of the collective 
participation was needed; for participation to be considered collective, a group of at least five 
farmers whose farms were located in the same municipality had to sign the same AES 
contract. The five-farmer threshold was chosen in order to be large enough to require an effort 
from the farmers to create the group, and small enough to avoid farmers’ negative perceptions 
of large groups. It was explained to farmers that they could freely create the group with those 
whom they trust the most. Also, it was specified that if a farmer of the collective was 
monitored and found not to comply with the scheme requirements, in addition to regular 
sanctions being imposed on that farmer (calculated, as per usual, according to the nature and 
gravity of the infringement), the other farmers in the collective would be monitored to ensure 
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their compliance with requirements. Regarding the attribute Monitoring (MONI), two levels 
were also set: 5 and 20% (MONI-5% and MONI-20%, respectively). The lower level was set 
equal to the normal monitoring level of the CAP measures, while the higher was set to make 
the difference with respect to the lower level more visible to the farmers (in the pre-test, a 
10% of monitoring level was used as the higher level but it was observed that it did not make 
the difference -in farmers’ eyes- with respect to the 5%-level). 
The last attribute, payment (PAYM), is normally included in this type of analysis to 
derive willingness to accept (WTA) associated with each attribute considered. The four levels 
were set according to payments in SM7 (€204-286/ha per year). Two levels (€200/ha and 
€300/ha) were set in line with these payments, while two further levels (€100/ha and €400/ha) 
were set as minimum and maximum payments. 
Lastly, it is worth commenting on other policy design attributes not considered 
explicitly in the CE. In this sense, the contract length of the AES was set at five years, with no 
exit-option available, and the minimum area for participation was set at the area of the largest 
plot. The first two attributes are typical of AES in Spain, while the last was set to facilitate the 
answers of the farmers. 
2.3. Experimental design and data collection 
Considering the number of attributes and levels, a large number of AES profiles (128) can be 
constructed, resulting in 1924 combinations for a two-option choice set design. To create a 
more manageable number of options, the methodological approach of fractional factorial 
design and optimal orthogonal in the differences proposed by Street and Burgess (2007) was 
used, resulting in 192 profiles and a D-efficiency of 91.3%. To make the number of choice 
tasks manageable for respondents, the 192 choice sets were divided into 24 blocks of 8 choice 
sets each, with one farmer answering one block. In each choice set, farmers were asked to 
choose between two alternatives, in addition to a possible no-choice (Status Quo or SQ) 
option under which the farmer chooses to continue with his current practice. Appendix A 
shows an example of a choice set. 
A specific questionnaire was designed and tested to implement an ad hoc survey, which 
included five sets of questions: 1) Structural characteristics of the farm (farm size, type of 
tenancy, rain-fed or irrigated land, slope, age of the grove, olive tree density, subsidies 
perceived, etc.), 2) Characteristics of the olive grower (gender, age, off-farm economic 
activities, level of education, agricultural professional training, working time, etc.), 3) 
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Technology of production, information gathering about agricultural practices (soil 
management, pest management, pruning, irrigation and harvesting), farm employment, and 
yield obtained, 4) Choice sets as shown in Appendix A, and 5) Knowledge, attitudes and 
perceptions toward the implementation of AES in olive growing. 
A multi-stage sampling procedure was employed. In the first stage, five agricultural 
districts3 in Andalusia were selected as primary sampling units from a total of 52 following a 
stratified sampling proportional to olive grove area. The sampled districts cover 453,682 ha 
and account for 31.0% of Andalusian olive groves. In the next stage, 10 villages located in 
each of the sampled districts were selected as secondary sampling units using a random route 
procedure. Finally, in each village 6-8 personal interviews were conducted using convenience 
sampling4 to select participant olive growers. Finally, 330 properly filled-in questionnaires 
were obtained. Among them, 35 were considered to be protests5, reducing the total number of 
valid interviews to 295 (104 of which related to irrigated farms, which is roughly on par with 
the share of irrigated farms in Andalusian olive growing according to INE, 2014). The 
interviews were carried out from October 2013 to January 2014. A cheap talk was used to 
ensure that farmers understood correctly before answering the questionnaire. 
2.4. Model specification: latent class model 
To incorporate preference heterogeneity into choice modelling, the Latent Class Model 
approach (LCM) was used. LCM is a mixed logit model with a discrete distribution of 
parameters, well suited to the task of considering respondents’ preference heterogeneity and 
revealing its causes (Greene and Hensher, 2003). This approach reveals a considerable 
richness in the structure of preferences, supporting the hypothesis that there are latent classes, 
which would otherwise be unobservable (Scarpa and Thiene, 2005). Unlike continuous mixed 
models (such as Random Parameter Logit Models, RPL), LCM allows the grouping of 
individuals according to their preferences which is very useful when heterogeneous 
preferences are analyzed (Hess et al., 2011), especially for extracting policy implications 
(Hynes et al., 2008). Actually, several studies have recently used LCM to analyze the 
heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences toward agri-environmental policy (Ruto and Garrod, 
3 Campiña Norte and La Loma (province of Jaen), La Sierra and Campiña Alta (province of Cordoba), and Norte (province of 
Malaga). 
4 The sampling process consisted of looking for olive growers to be interviewed in each village (e.g., in agricultural 
cooperatives and private olive mills, agricultural public offices, gas stations, fertilizer shops or even at the street). 
5 Those who chose the SQ-option in all the choice sets without considering the alternative AES proposed in each (i.e., did not 
make trade-offs among alternatives but directly chose the SQ-option) were considered protests. The most commonly cited 
reason for always choosing the SQ-option was lack of trust in public institutions. This definition of protesters has also been 
used in previous works (e.g. Christensen et al., 2011). 
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2009; Schulz et al., 2014, among others). These studies prove the usefulness of the latent 
classes approach in analyzing such heterogeneity. 
As mentioned, latent heterogeneity is analyzed through a model of discrete parameter 
variation, where it is assumed that individuals are implicitly sorted into a set of s classes. 
However, the specific class of each individual is unknown to the analyst. Therefore, the LCM 
approach is based on a class membership probability equation, which has a classical logit 
formulation (assuming that the error components are identically and independently distributed 
following a Gumbel distribution). Thus, preference heterogeneity is captured by 
simultaneously assigning individuals to behavioral groups or latent classes while estimating a 
choice model. Formally, in the LCM, the utility (U) of alternative j ∈ J to individual n (in a 
choice situation t) who belongs to a particular class s, can be written as: 
𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗|𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗        [1] 
where Xjnt is a vector of attributes associated with alternative j and individual n, βs is a class 
specific parameter vector associated with the vector of explanatory choice attributes Xjn and 
εjn is the unobserved heterogeneity (the scale parameter is normalized to 1 and omitted). 
Within the class, choice probabilities are assumed to be generated by the multinomial logit 
model. The probability (P) of an individual n, who makes a sequence of choices (y1, y2,… yT) 
among a particular set of alternatives J, to belong to class s is given by the following common 
formulation (Colombo et al., 2009): 
Ss
X
X
Z
ZP
T
t
J
j
njts
njts
S
s
S
s
ns
ns
n ,.....,1
)exp(
)exp(
)exp(
)exp() ],....yy,[y(
1
1
1
T21 =
























= ∏
∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
β
β
α
α  [2] 
where the first expression in brackets is the probability of observing the individual in class s 
according to a set of individual-specific characteristics (the Zn variables and their parameters 
αs), with the remaining coefficients explained above. In our empirical approach class 
membership have been estimated based on farmers’ preferences only. An overview of the 
specification of the LCM can be found in Hess et al. (2011). 
In the LCM used here, the attributes CCMA and COLLE are treated as dummy coded 
variables (non-linear effects), CCAR, EFA and MONI as end-point linear variables and 
PAYM as linear variable. 
To choose the optimal number of classes, log-likelihood (LL), minimum Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), and minimum Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics 
were used. Table 2 shows the values of these statistics for one-class to five-classes solutions. 
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As is shown in this table, LL, AIC and BIC statistics experienced a marked improvement (i.e., 
higher LL, and lower AIC and BIC) in each step of estimation from the one-class solution 
(LL=-2.107; AIC=1.791; BIC=1.808) to four-class solution (LL=-1569; AIC=1.356; 
BIC=1.432), simultaneously resulting in a marked increase in the McFadden’s pseudo-R2. For 
a higher number of classes, there were worse model parsimony and no clear improvement in 
all the statistics (the five-class solution had negligible improvements for LL, Pseudo-R2 and 
AIC, but higher BIC, with respect to the four-class solution). Therefore, we opted for a four-
class solution. 
Table 2. Criteria used for setting the optimal class number*. 
Nº of segments/ 
classes 
Nº of 
parameters (P) LL 
McFadden`s 
Pseudo-R2 AIC BIC 
1 7 -2107.08 0.177 1.791 1.808 
2 15 -1781.11 0.311 1.522 1.559 
3 23 -1672.93 0.352 1.437 1.493 
4 31 -1569.39 0.391 1.356 1.432 
5 39 -1556.16 0.395 1.352 1.447 
* Sample: 295 individuals (N), 2360 choices. M. Pseudo-R2=1-(LL/LL0); AIC=-2(LL-P); BIC=–LL+(P/2)ln(N). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
2.5. Welfare analysis and AES scenarios 
Marginal rates of substitution between non-monetary and monetary attributes were estimated 
by calculating the ratio of the coefficient of the former to the negative of the coefficient of the 
latter [WTANM = -(βNM / βM)]. These are also called the “implicit prices”, representing the 
WTA for a 1% or 1 unit increase in the quantity of the attribute in question if it is quantitative 
(e.g., area of EFA), or for a discrete change in the attribute (e.g., from free to restrictive 
CCMA) if it is qualitative. We apply the Delta method to determine analytically the variance 
and the standard error of WTA, which is commonly used in CE applications. The 
mathematical formulation of this method is beyond the scope of the paper, but interested 
readers may consult Bliemer and Rose (2013) for a full explanation. Additionally, to provide 
a broader picture of the required payments for different AES scenarios and to estimate the 
adoption rates in terms of farmers and area, welfare changes were calculated. Thus, individual 
welfare changes related to hypothetical policy options or scenarios (U1) that change several 
attribute levels simultaneously with respect to the status quo (U0) can be obtained by using the 
compensating surplus (CS) formula [CS = -1 / βM × (U0 - U1)] described by Hanemann 
(1984). For these estimates we have assumed linearity and separability properties in the utility 
function. 
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The five hypothetical AES scenarios used for the analysis are shown in Table 3. They 
represent different AES alternatives, with different combinations of the attributes of the CE. 
The two least restrictive scenarios are M_25 and EFA_50. The former is an AES with 
CCMA-Restr and CCAR-25%, and the latter is an AES with CCAR-50% and EFA-2%. The 
two most restrictive scenarios are AES_Max and AES_MaxC, which represent AES with all 
the attributes at their highest levels (CCMA-Restr, CCAR-50%, and EFA-2%) with individual 
and collective participation, respectively. Finally, there is also an intermediate scenario, 
EFAM_25, with CCMA-Restr, CCAR-25%, and EFA-2%. In all the scenarios, MONI 
remains constant and equal to 5%, since it was not significant in the LCM. Finally, we assume 
that a farmer would participate in a certain AES scenario if the level of payment is equal or 
higher than the disutility (in absolute terms) experienced by the farmer (i.e. CS) when he/she 
participates in such AES. 
Table 3. AES scenarios considered for the analysis. 
Scenario 
CCAR 
(% of olive  
tree area) 
CCMA 
(1=CCMA-Restr) 
EFA 
(% of olive  
tree area) 
COLLE 
(1=collective 
participation) 
MONI 
(% of monitored 
farms) 
M_25 25 1 0 0 5 
EFA_50 50 0 2 0 5 
EFAM_25 25 1 2 0 5 
AES_Max 50 1 2 0 5 
AES_MaxC 50 1 2 1 5 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Classes of farmers in function of their preferences toward AES 
The results of the LCM are presented in Table 4. It can be observed that the model is highly 
signiﬁcant and ﬁts well, as shown by the value of pseudo-R2. The addition of preference 
heterogeneity across the latent classes yielded a signiﬁcant improvement in LCM goodness of 
ﬁt compared to a Conditional Logit Model (CLM) goodness of ﬁt (pseudo-R2=0.177; LL=-
2107.0). As can be observed, four different classes were obtained based on farmers’ 
preferences toward AES. All but one of the attributes are highly significant determinants of 
choice, and in every case their coefficients have the expected sign. MONI is the attribute that 
received the least attention from farmers (only significant for farmers included in Class C2), 
indicating that the level of monitoring played a minor role in their choices. 
The differences among the four different classes can be better appreciated by 
observing Table 5, which shows WTA estimates and their confidence intervals. As can be 
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observed in this table, there is clearly one class that groups potential participants (Class C1), 
comprising 29.7% of the surveyed farmers with the lowest WTA for the attributes. Beside it, 
there is another class (Class C2, 14.6% of the farmers) that groups farmers who would only be 
willing to participate in AES if CCMA-Restr was not required, while also showing 
moderately high WTA for COLLE. Class C3 (42.1% of the farmers) and especially Class C4 
(13.7% of the farmers) group potential non-participants but for different reasons. The former 
would not be willing to participate in any AES that includes EFA and displays moderately 
high WTA for the rest of the attributes. The latter would not be willing to participate in any 
collective AES which includes the use of CC (COLLE and CCAR), while the WTA for 
CCMA and EFA is also moderately high. 
Table 4. Latent Class Model. 
Attributes 
C1 C2 C3 C4 
Coef.  s.e. Coef.  s.e. Coef.  s.e. Coef.  s.e. 
CCAR -0.015 ** 0.005 -0.026 *** 0.006 -0.050 *** 0.002 -0.118 *** 0.015 
CCMA -0.163  0.126 -6.104 *** 0.472 -0.811 *** 0.058 -1.120 *** 0.296 
EFA -0.119 * 0.059 -0.059  0.041 -0.559 *** 0.032 -0.260 *** 0.049 
COLLE -0.592 *** 0.130 -0.717 *** 0.214 -1.306 *** 0.072 -5.023 *** 0.747 
MONI -0.009  0.007 -0.041 ** 0.015 0.002  0.005 -0.043  0.026 
PAYM 0.014 *** 0.001 0.006 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.000 0.006 ** 0.002 
ASCsq -0.571  0.456 -2.284 *** 0.323 -0.419 *** 0.118 4.095 *** 0.690 
Share (%) 29.7% 14.6% 42.1% 13.7% 
LL = -1569.7 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 = 0.391 
         
Number of choices: 2360       
*, **, and *** reflect significance at 5, 1, and 0.1% levels respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table 5. Willingness to accept (WTA) of the attributes (€/ha)µ. 
Attribute C1 C2 C3 C4 
CCAR 1.0
** 4.1*** 13.5*** 20.4** 
(0.3/1.7) (1.8/6.5) (10.6/16.3) (8.1/32.7) 
CCMA 11.3 978.6
*** 220.3*** 193.6* 
(-6.0/28.6) (657.3/1300.0) (169.8/270.8) (41.3/345.9) 
EFA 8.2
* 9.4ns 151.8*** 44.9** 
(0.2/16.3) (-4.6/23.5) (120.1/183.6) (13.3/76.6) 
COLLE 41.2
*** 115.0** 354.7*** 868.0** 
(23.3/59.0) (33.9/196.1) (277.6/431.7) (306.8/1429.3) 
MONI 0.6
ns 6.5* -0.5ns 7.4ns 
(-0.4/1.6) (1.4/11.6) (-3.1/2.1) (-3.3/18.2) 
µ For CCAR, EFA, and MONI, it is € per 1% of increase in each of them (e.g. 1% of EFA in olive groves area). For CCMA 
and COLLE, it is € for changing from free to restrictive CCMA and from individual to collective participation respectively. 
*, **, and *** reflect significance at 5, 1, and 0.1% levels, respectively, while ns reflects non significance. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Farmer/farm characteristics of the four classes (see Tables 6 and 7) go a long way to 
explaining their stated preferences toward AES. C1 has features typically related to high 
likelihood of AES uptake. Specifically, its farmers are younger, have a higher level of 
education, are more likely to be professionally trained, have a more in-depth knowledge of the 
AES implemented in the region and cross-compliance requisites (knowledge index)6, perceive 
the use of CC as economically and environmentally beneficial, and participate more in the 
former AES SM7. Furthermore, their farms are larger, have a lower single payment per 
hectare, use less conventional techniques, and harvest fewer ground olives (i.e. olives from 
the soil surface). Finally it is worth mentioning that this class principally comprises irrigated 
olive groves, which reportedly make greater use of CC (Rodríguez-Entrena and Arriaza, 
2013). Actually, C1 has a higher level of initial compliance with the levels of all agronomic 
attributes, although only 7.7% of its farmers fully comply with all of them (i.e., make use of 
CCMA-Restr, CCAR-50% and EFA-2%). All of these features are reported in the literature as 
being related to higher AES uptake (see Falconer, 2000, Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Hodge and 
Reader, 2010; and Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013, among others). 
The other three classes are generally characterized by features negatively correlated to 
AES uptake, but with differences among them that explain their different WTA. As regards 
C2, WTA estimates for all attributes are higher than those obtained for C1 but lower than 
those obtained for the other two classes, with the exception of CCMA. There are several 
characteristics that confirm this intermediate position with regard to WTA estimates. It is the 
class with the youngest farmers. Furthermore, their farms are above average with regard to 
olive groves and total area, they present lower single payment per hectare, make lower use of 
conventional techniques, there is a lower share of non-trained farmers, and they have the 
highest percentage of EFA (which explains the low WTA for EFA). Lastly, it is worth noting 
the majority of C2-farmers have rain-fed olive groves (64.3%), in which CC management 
usually consists of tilling and, to a lesser extent, applying herbicides. So, they do not normally 
refuse to use CC but rather refuse to manage it without using tillage, in the belief that tillage 
helps reduce soil water evaporation during summertime. Thus, it is not surprising that C2-
farmers show the highest WTA for implementing CCMA-Restr. 
6 Knowledge index is obtained using the following discrete variables: knowledge of the requisites of cross compliance 
regarding both the use of CC in plots with average slope over 10% and the commitment of conserving riparian vegetation 
(scoring 2, 1 or 0 if the farmer is aware of both requisites, only one or none of them, respectively); and knowledge of options 
of AES available to the farmer (scoring 1 if the farmer is aware of AES in Andalusia, 2 if he/she is also aware of one AES in 
olive groves, SM7 or organic olive growing, and 3 if he/she is aware of both SM7 and organic olive growing). Then, the 
index is computed summing both variables divided by 2 and 3, respectively, in order to obtain a variable (“Knowledge 
index”) ranging from 0 to 1. 
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With regard to C3, preferences of this non-participant class are mainly characterized 
by high WTA for all attributes, especially EFA. Hence, WTA estimates are higher than those 
reported for not only C1 but also C2, except for CCMA in the case of the latter. Accordingly, 
farm/farmer characteristics reflect this non-participant condition, with some characteristics 
shared with the other non-participant class (C4). C3 is the class with the smallest average 
olive tree and total area, highest single payment per hectare, smallest share of AES 
participating farmers, highest share of non-trained farmers, and it ranks second in terms of age 
and use of conventional farming techniques. With respect to any of these characteristics, 
however, C3 presents statistically significant differences from C4. In any case, there are other 
features of C3 that differentiate it from C4, and explain their different preferences toward 
AES. For example, C3-farmers have a more positive perception of the use of CC, and have a 
moderately high knowledge index. Moreover, it is the class with the highest share of irrigated 
olive groves, which is also related to the higher adoption of CC. These differences seem to be 
behind the non-extreme WTA estimates regarding CCAR and CCMA. Regarding the former, 
despite the characteristics positively correlated to CC use, it is worth noting that WTA is still 
high (€13.5 per 1% of CCAR). The main reason behind such a high WTA is that C3-farmers 
find that high levels of CCAR hinder the harvesting of ground olives. Accordingly, C3 is the 
class with both the lowest percentage of farmers with CCAR equal to or higher than 50% 
(CCAR-50%=5.1%) and the highest percentage of olives harvested from the ground. As 
regards EFA, C3 has the highest WTA, which is to be expected given it is also the class with 
lowest percentage of EFA (0.68%), consistent with the fact that they are mostly located in 
Jaen (where an olive monoculture exists). 
C4 has the highest WTA regarding COLLE and CCAR, as well as moderately high 
WTA for CCMA and EFA. Thus, it represents a genuine class of non-participants. This fact 
can be explained by the extreme figures related with farmer characteristics: highest age and 
lowest levels of education, knowledge index and appreciation of CC. Moreover, as a non-
participant class, it has low olive tree and total area, high single payment per hectare, low 
level of farming training, and high use of conventional techniques (as does C3). 
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Table 6. Description of the classes. Average values of numerical variables*. 
Type Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 Total Kruskal-Wallis H p-value 
Farm 
Olive tree area (ha) 35.8 b 28.3 ab 19.5 a 22.4 a 26.1 8.46 0.037 
Total area (ha) 43.6 b 33.1 ab 21.1 a 23.7 a 30.0 9.65 0.022 
Ground harvested / total olive harvested (%) 9.3 a 15.6 ab 22.3 b 13.9 a 16.1 18.29 0.000 
CC / olive tree area (%) 32.4 b 22.2 a 22.0 a 21.3 a 25.1 10.69 0.014 
EFA / olive tree area (%) 1.71 b 1.79 b 0.68 a 1.50 ab 1.28 11.54 0.009 
Single payment (€/ha) 513.6 a 536.1 ab 640.1 b 634.5 ab 585.4 10.93 0.012 
Farmer 
Age (years) 49.3 ab 46.5 a 50.8 bc 54.5 c 50.3 11.05 0.011 
Knowledge indexµ (adim., 0 to 1) 0.49 b 0.41 ab 0.42 ab 0.33 a 0.424 10.68 0.014 
Perception of CC as environmentally beneficial (adim., 1-5) 4.40 b 4.24 ab 4.43 b 3.84 a 4.30 8.63 0.035 
Perception of CC as economically beneficial (adim., 1-5) 3.78 c 2.88 ab 3.78 bc 2.36 a 3.43 37.59 0.000 
* Mann-Whitney U was used in pairwise comparisons between classes to show ranking (see superscript letters), at a 5% significance level. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table 7. Description of the classes. Categorical variables (in %)*. 
Type Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 
Total Chi-square 
% Obs. χ2 p-value 
Farm 
Cordoba 42.9  47.6  38.1  45.5  42.0 124 1.51 0.680 
Jaen 29.7 a 28.6 ab 51.7 b 31.8 ab 38.6 114 14.23 0.003 
Malaga 27.5 b 23.8 ab 10.2 a 22.7 ab 19.3 57 11.09 0.011 
Mountain olive groves 26.4  21.4  25.4  27.3  25.4 75 0.48 0.924 
Rain-fed olive groves 33.0 a 64.3 b 33.1 a 45.5 ab 39.3 104 15.15 0.002 
Irrigated olive groves 40.7 b 14.3 a 41.5 b 27.3 ab 35.3 116 12.52 0.006 
Use of conventional techniques 56.0  59.5  71.2  72.7  65.1 192 6.91 0.075 
Participation in current AES 26.4 b 11.9 ab 11.9 a 13.6 ab 16.6 49 9.13 0.028 
Farmer 
Education level-at least high school 54.0 b 33.3 ab 36.8 ab 27.3 a 40.0 116 11.39 0.010 
Not trained 42.0 a 47.6 ab 65.8 b 60.5 ab 55.1 158 12.78 0.005 
* Z-test was used to show ranking (see superscript letters), at a 5% significance level.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
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3.2. AES Scenarios 
Table 8 shows the results of estimates regarding compensating surpluses for each 
scenario and each class. Logically, the different preferences among classes hold, with C1 
being the class with the lowest compensating surpluses (less than €100/ha) in any of the 
scenarios, and C4 the class with the highest compensating surpluses on average. C2, on the 
other hand, shows very high compensating surpluses for scenarios that include CCMA-Restr 
(all the scenarios considered except EFA_50), and C3 also has high compensating surpluses, 
especially when more EFA and CC area are required. Assuming estimates of compensating 
surpluses as the money required to make farmers participate in AES, it is likely that C1-
farmers would participate in any of the five scenarios considered in return for relatively low 
payments; C4-farmers would require an unaffordable high level of payments (above €430/ha) 
to make them participate in any of the scenarios; while C2-farmers would likely participate in 
a scenario without CCMA-Restr (e.g., EFA_50, at a payment of €135.7/ha), but not in the 
other four scenarios; and C3s would only participate in a scenario without EFA and with low 
CC area (e.g., M_25) for a moderately high payment (€245.9/ha). 
Table 8. Mean compensating surpluses for AES scenarios in the 4 classes, in €/ha 
(standard errors in brackets). 
Scenario C1 C2 C3 C4 
M_25 13.8 * (5.4) 976.2*** (163.0) 245.9*** (25.7) 437.2** (139.8) 
EFA_50 33.0 *** (9.5) 135.7*** (39.7) 615.2*** (63.2) 716.6** (222.5) 
EFAM_25 23.6 ** (7.5) 988.8*** (167.1) 478.2*** (48.2) 499.2** (160.6) 
AES_Max 39.1 *** (10.7) 1065.4*** (180.8) 751.7*** (75.9) 879.2** (274.6) 
AES_MaxC 80.3 *** (14.2) 1180.4*** (205.8) 1106.4*** (112.0) 1747.2** (542.7) 
*, **, and *** reflect significance at 5, 1, and 0.1% levels respectively. 
 Source: Own elaboration. 
Figure 1 shows the likelihood of participation in AES both in terms of percentage of 
farmers and area for the different scenarios considered and different payments. Clearly, the 
participation rate (in terms of both farmers and area) changes depending on the scenario 
considered. For example, at the €100/ha-level of payment 18% and 45% of the farmers would 
be willing to participate in AES_MaxC and M_25, respectively, which corresponds to the 
minimum and maximum rate obtained for the five scenarios. In terms of area, for the same 
€100/ha-level of payment the participation rate is higher than in terms of farmers, ranging 
from 30 to 60% of the area depending on the scenario. This difference between both ranges of 
percentage is due to C1-farmers, as they are those who first participate in AES at lower 
payments and own larger farms. 
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Figure 1 provides interesting information for policy-makers, as it shows the convexity 
of participation rate curves, allowing the identification of the points of the curve of each 
scenario where further increases in the payment yield a lower response in terms of 
participation rates. In the case of farmers’ participation rate in the AES_MaxC scenario, that 
point is reached at approximately €125/ha (which corresponds to a 27% participation rate), 
which indicates that there would be a smaller response in terms of farmer participation in this 
AES scenario once this payment threshold is exceeded. Logically, this threshold is different 
depending on the scenario considered, being €100/ha for EFA_50, EFAM_25 and AES_Max 
(40, 36 and 32% participation rate, respectively); and €50/ha for M_25 (41% participation 
rate). In terms of area, the picture changes slightly, with the most cost-efficient payments 
remaining the same as for farmers (€125/ha and 46% participation rate for AES_MaxC; 
€100/ha and 52% and 60% for AES_Max and EFA_50; and €50/ha and 60% for M_25) with 
the exception of one scenario (€75/ha for EFAM_25 and 52% participation rate). 
Figure 1. Participation in different scenarios of AES and payments. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
4. Discussion and policy implications 
There is a high heterogeneity among olive growers’ regarding their preferences toward AES 
under current conditions and policy makers must take this into account when designing such 
schemes. A potential participant class (C1) is clearly identified, comprising 30% of farmers 
and 41% of area, irrespective of the combination of attributes of the scheme. In order to 
encourage more farmers to be participants, careful attention would have to be paid to the 
combination of attributes and the monetary incentive established. For instance, to encourage 
an additional 15% of farmers (class C2) to participate in AES, a moderately higher monetary 
incentive would be required and the use of tillage and herbicides in managing CC should not 
be restricted. Also, for most C3-farmers (representing 42% of the total), higher monetary 
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incentives would be required but with lower levels of stringency in each attribute. 
Nevertheless, there is a group of farmers (C4) that would not participate in AES whatever the 
combination of attributes. Apart from payments and requisites, an additional way to 
encourage farmers’ AES uptake could be to improve relevant features such as farmers’ 
training and information about AES and its attributes. 
In this section the most relevant points arising from the results are outlined, first those 
related to each of the attributes separately, and second those linked to the proposed AES 
scenarios. 
4.1. Design and agronomic attributes in AES 
As stated previously, the use of CC is the most relevant agricultural practice in terms of 
enhancing the production of public goods in olive growing. This is why the Regional 
government has widely encouraged its use. Not surprisingly, then, our survey reveals that this 
practice is quite widely used nowadays (three quarters of the sampled farmers use CC, being 
25% the average area covered). With regard to the CC area attribute, we find that 44% of 
the farmers (C1 and C2) would be willing to use CC at a 50%-level of olive tree area for low-
to-medium monetary incentives (€1.0/ha and €4.1/ha per 1% of increase of CCAR, 
respectively) while the rest (C3 and C4) would not. Yet, reasons behind high WTA differ 
between the latter two classes. C4-farmers are not willing to use CC because they do not 
consider it useful. For them, CC are weeds and, as these farmers are the oldest and least 
educated, it is very difficult to convince them not to remove CC. The case of C3 is more 
complex. C3-farmers would not be willing to reach a 50% level of CCAR since it would 
make it more difficult to harvest ground olives, which is important for these farmers. If we 
assumed that C3-farmers believe that reaching CCAR-50% totally precludes the harvesting of 
ground olives, net income forgone could be estimated at €183-350/ha (using estimates by 
Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011), while the WTA of C3-farmers to reach that level would be 
€378/ha on average. Thus, it seems that C3-farmers’ WTA is in line with their perceived net 
income forgone. Regarding this point, it is worth commenting that the olive oil industry 
usually pays less for ground olives because of their characteristic dirtiness and worse 
organoleptic properties. In this sense, there is a market incentive for early harvesting directly 
from the tree. Hence, from a policy perspective it may be worth training farmers to avoid 
ground olives harvesting, enabling olive growers to benefit from this quality premium. If this 
were the case, net income forgone associated with CC (from harvesting of ground olives) 
would be much lower or even non-existent, reducing WTA for implementing this practice. 
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Regarding CC management, most of the farmers would not be willing to manage CC 
without tilling and/or with restrictions as to the number of herbicide treatments (3 classes, 
totaling 70.3% of the farmers, show average WTA higher than €190/ha). This is in line with 
the evidence found in the literature that highlights strong farmer preferences toward flexibility 
concerning farming requisites included in AES (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Christensen et 
al., 2011). For the case of olive growing two main reasons are behind these results, namely 
the existence of resistant species and farmers’ beliefs regarding soil water conservation. 
Regarding the former, many olive growers are worried about the presence of resistant species 
within CC, and thus they have a negative perception of the reduction of permitted options to 
manage CC. Regarding the latter, many producers, especially those with traditional plain 
olive groves (non-steep slope-land and rain-fed conditions), consider tillage a convenient way 
to reduce soil water evaporation during summertime. As a result, CCMA-Restr appears very 
stringent to most of the olive growers. If policy-makers wanted a participation rate above 30% 
they would be justified in not including such a requisite. Alternatively, it would be worth 
considering it as a requisite only under certain circumstances (e.g., in environmentally-
sensitive areas). 
With regard to the ecological focus areas, we find that there are two classes of 
farmers (C1 and C2, totaling 44% of the sampled farmers) that would be willing to implement 
them in exchange for low payments (€8.2/ha and €9.4/ha per additional 1% of the farmland 
devoted to EFA, respectively), another class for a low-medium payment (C4 with €44.9/ha 
per additional 1% devoted to EFA) and another for a high payment (C3 with €151.8/ha per 
additional 1% devoted to EFA). Similar estimates were produced by Schulz et al. (2014), who 
also distinguished between farmers willing and not willing to implement EFA in their arable 
land (with average WTA of €8.9/ha and €51.4/ha per additional 1% devoted to EFA, 
respectively). With regard to C1 and C2-farmers, their WTA are similar to their net income 
forgone (€8.2-15.7/ha, also using estimates by Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011). However, 
low willingness to participate in AES shown by C3 and C4-farmers results in much higher 
WTA, substantially above their net income forgone.  
If a share of EFA beyond 2-3% was required the WTA would presumably be higher 
regardless of the class considered, bearing in mind the general farmers’ rejection of the option 
of complying with EFA by maintaining some olive trees out of production. Such rejection is 
reflected in two figures obtained from the survey: first, the 97% of sampled olive growers 
have not any olive tree out of production in their farm; second, only 30% of the sampled olive 
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growers that would be willing to participate in AES would also be willing to use olive trees 
out of production to comply with the minimum share of EFA. This suggests that those olive 
growers willing to comply with a minimum of EFA would do it mostly by using buffer strips, 
vegetation boundaries and islets, being all of these elements limited by the spatial restrictions 
revealed in olive groves. Therefore, higher levels of EFA (e.g., 5-7%), apart from being very 
difficult to achieve in the case of Andalusian olive groves, would require very high monetary 
incentives. This result calls for careful consideration of the specific initial circumstances of 
the farms, taking into account that some of them could easily comply with EFA requirements 
-at least for low levels-, while others could barely comply even at the lowest levels. In the 
case of the latter, it would be necessary to make use of the EFA equivalents allowed in the 
future CAP if EFA were also enforced in permanent crops. 
With regard to collective participation, the four classes of farmers reflect different 
levels of disutility, from low (C1, €41.2/ha) to very high (C4, €868.0/ha) WTA. The 
qualitative information gathered during the survey suggests that the different WTA estimates 
are likely due to the different farmers’ perception of transaction costs related to collective 
participation in AES (in line with the evidences found in Rocamora-Montiel et al., 2014) and 
the different disutility anticipated or expected by farmers related to losing a bit -more- of their 
freedom of farm management due to such a participation. To be precise in regard to the latter, 
farmers value differently the fact of being controlled not only by the Administration, as in 
every AES, but also by farmer-members of the group who, more importantly, are also 
neighbors of the same village. 
Given the wide range of WTA for collective participation in AES, setting the 
monetary incentive is crucial to promote collective participation in AES. The latest CAP 
regulations include an up-to-30% bonus to promote such participation. According to the WTA 
approach, none of the classes would participate in return for this bonus at the cost-efficient 
payments highlighted for each scenario. For instance, AES_Max presents a cost-efficient 
payment of €100€/ha; with a bonus of €30/ha none of the classes would be willing to 
participate in AES_Max collectively. If the reference was included in the AES currently 
applied (SM7), 30% would represent €61.2-85.8/ha, which would imply that only C1-farmers 
would participate collectively. Thus, the collective bonus has to be large enough to promote 
collective participation, although not larger than the gains expected from it. As regards the 
latter, although expected gains from the reduction of public transaction costs could easily be 
estimated, those derived from the higher environmental performance are far more difficult to 
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quantify, depending not only on the requisites/practices included in the AES, but also the 
proximity and configuration of enrolled farmland (Sutherland et al., 2012). Thus, an up-to-
30% bonus can be considered too rough an estimation to reflect society’s net gains from 
collective participation. Therefore, it is clear that further research is needed to cover 
knowledge gaps about costs and -in particular- gains of collective participation. 
With respect to the level of monitoring, the main outcome here is that farmers are 
barely aware of it when it comes to choosing whether to participate in AES or not, at least in 
the presence of other attributes that they perceive as more important. This appears to be 
counterintuitive and in opposition to the literature on AES uptake. Actually, Broch and Vedel 
(2012) estimated farmers’ WTA of €38/ha per 1% absolute increase in the level of 
monitoring. Our results indicate different farmer behavior, thus calling for further research to 
establish to what extent significant disutility to higher levels of monitoring in AES can 
generally be expected. This further research could be focused on the reasons behind this 
different behavior. In particular, the informal information collected during the survey suggests 
that two different reasons could be behind such low WTA, namely the willingness to comply 
with the requisites (expecting “fair” monitoring) and the adoption of strategic behavior (i.e., 
not willing to comply, assuming that they will not be fully monitored). Moreover, it could 
also be explored whether the enforcement of low sanctions in previous AES in olive growing 
would be another explanation for such a low WTA. 
The classes heterogeneity points out to some general factors influencing AES uptake 
which are worth discussing. Among factors related to farm characteristics, the results suggest 
a positive relationship of farm area and irrigated olive groves with respect to AES uptake. The 
fact that larger farms are usually more willing to participate in AES has been widely reported 
in previous works, not only for arable cropping systems (Falconer, 2000; Ruto and Garrod, 
2009; Hodge and Reader, 2010, among others) but also for permanent cropping systems such 
as olive groves (Franco, 2011). As these authors highlight, higher economies of scale and 
comparatively lower transaction costs are the main reasons behind their greater willingness to 
participate in AES. In the case of irrigated farms, there appear to be more than one reason 
behind such a relationship. On the one hand, irrigated olive groves usually require a more 
qualified management than rainfed ones, thus their farmers are frequently more prone to adopt 
new technology and have higher training level (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011). In this 
regard, literature reports professional training as a positive factor of adoption of innovations 
by olive growers (Franco and Calatrava-Leyva, 2010; Rodríguez-Entrena and Arriaza, 2013; 
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Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2014a). In addition, for the case study there is a more specific 
reason related to the use of CC as a requisite of AES, namely: as a result of the lower 
competition for water between irrigated olive trees and CC, farmers are less reluctant to adopt 
CC (Franco and Calatrava-Leyva, 2010) and, thus, to participate in an AES that includes this 
practice as a requisite.  
In considering farmers’ characteristics, age, knowledge and perception, as well as the 
abovementioned farmer’s training, appear to be related to AES uptake. The fact that younger 
farmers are more willing to adopt soil conservation practices (Calatrava-Leyva et al., 2007) 
and to participate in AES, for both, arable cropping systems (Ruto and Garrod, 2009) and 
permanent ones (Franco, 2011), has been largely indicated in the specialized literature. With 
regard to farmer’s knowledge, as Franco and Calatrava-Leyva (2010) point out, olive growers 
who update their technical knowledge are more willing to adopt soil conservation practices. 
Also, farmer’s perception has revealed to be key for adopting soil conservation practices and 
AES. In our research, it appears that the greater the perception of CC as environmentally and 
economically beneficial, the higher the AES uptake is. The positive farmers’ attitude toward 
the environmental benefits of using certain practices has been previously remarked as a factor 
of AES uptake (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). Furthermore, Franco and Calatrava-Leyva (2010) 
found that those olive growers who more significantly perceived soil erosion as an important 
problem in their farms were more willing to adopt soil conservation practices. The positive 
relationship between the perception of CC as economically beneficial and the adoption of 
environmental-friendly practices is also in line with results obtained by Rodríguez-Entrena et 
al. (2014a), who highlighted the influence of economic parameters of olive groves (such as, 
output and profitability) on the adoption of soil conservation practices. 
4.2. AES scenarios in olive growing 
In the context of the CAP, in olive growing there are only two relevant levels of 
compensation regarding the production of environmental public goods, one is defined by 
cross-compliance and the other by AES (the intermediate level fixed by the green payment 
does not apply for permanent crops). In this sense, the scenarios proposed in the previous 
section include environmental requirements beyond the former, from moderate to large 
increase in the environmental performance (represented by M_25 and AES_Max, 
respectively). They also represent a different policy scope, from a wide targeted area with 
moderate increase in environmental performance to a limited targeted area with large increase 
in such performance. For instance, if we assume that the budget for AES in olive growing is 
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to remain the same as for the Andalusian Rural Development Program 2007-2013 
(€12.25m/year), and use levels of payment identified as the most cost-efficient, it can be 
estimated that 245,000 ha (16.3% of the olive grove area of Andalusia) would be enrolled in 
M_25 for a payment of €50/ha. In contrast, for the same budget, 122,500 ha (8.2%) would be 
enrolled in AES_Max for a payment of €100/ha. This figure would be even lower if collective 
participation was required (98,000 ha ‒6.5%– for AES_MaxC with a payment of €125/ha). 
Whatever the policy approach, policy makers must ensure that gains outweigh the 
costs of AES implementation from a public point of view. For instance, using estimates 
obtained from Rodríguez-Entrena et al. (2012), Andalusian society’s compensating surplus 
for implementing M_25 would be €103.7/ha, and €204.8/ha for AES_Max7. Accordingly, for 
both AES scenarios, there would be a net benefit from their implementation if payments were 
established below those figures (assuming zero transaction costs). Then, at the cost-effective 
payments of €50/ha and €100/ha identified for M_25 and AES_Max, it can be concluded that 
society would benefit from the implementation of these two AES scenarios. However, the 
choice between these two scenarios is not straightforward as total net benefits would be very 
similar (€13.2million and €12.8million respectively, obtained by multiplying net gains by area 
enrolled). In any case, for a more robust conclusion in this regard, further research would be 
needed in order to refine benefit estimates (more targeted valuation assessment) and the 
inclusion of actual transaction costs. If these results were confirmed, an interesting option 
would be to explore the implementation of two levels of AES simultaneously, similar to the 
Entry and Higher Level of Stewardship scheme in the UK (Hodge and Reader, 2010). 
 
5. Conclusions 
AES are useful policy instruments for enhancing the orientation of CAP to the production of 
environmental public goods (Hodge, 2013). In spite of the extensive literature generated about 
such schemes, some important issues remain understudied. Here we have analyzed several 
issues that have received little or no attention, namely the implementation of AES in 
permanent crops, EFA and collective participation. 
Some valuable conclusions of special interest for agri-environmental policy-making 
can be drawn from the results. First, a high degree of heterogeneity was found as regards olive 
7 These figures are obtained using the following estimates: €29.7/t CO2 sequestered; €4.2/t of soil loss prevented; and 
€0.6/bird·ha (Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2012). Additionally, to include benefits from higher visual quality of landscape when 
EFA and CC were presented, ratios between such functions and the other environmental functions were used according to 
estimates from Arriaza and Gómez-Limón (2011). 
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growers’ preferences toward AES. In particular, four different classes of olive growers have 
been distinguished based on their preferences. There are clearly two extreme classes: one 
comprising potential participants (i.e., members are willing to participate even with stringent 
requirements) and another comprising non-participants. There are two other intermediate 
classes that comprise farmers willing to participate but with different combinations of 
requirements and different WTA. 
Second, such heterogeneity is also reflected separately in most of the attributes 
studied. Hence, we find different intensity of preferences toward each attribute when the 
comparison is made within classes. For instance, there is clearly one class that rejects EFA, 
another that rejects restrictive management of CC, and two classes that reject both collective 
participation and using CC, with intermediate classes for all the attributes. The only exception 
is the level of monitoring, which received little attention from most of the farmers. This 
specific result about monitoring calls for further research given the fact that other works 
report the opposite (i.e., monitoring is a strong determinant of farmers’ preferences toward 
AES). Moreover, farmer/farm characteristics play a major role as determinants of farmers’ 
preferences toward AES, suggesting that it may be worth implementing some complementary 
measures in order to increase participation rates in AES (e.g., specific training programs for 
farmers). 
Third, specific policy implications can also be derived regarding each attribute. With 
respect to the agronomic attributes (concerning CC and EFA), training, status quo, and 
flexibility of the requirements are important factors in farmers’ choice as to whether to 
participate in AES that include such attributes. As regards EFA, almost half of the farmers 
would be willing to accept it for a low monetary incentive (€8-9/ha per additional 1% of the 
farmland devoted to EFA) while the rest would do it for a moderate to high monetary 
incentive (€41-151/ha per additional 1% of EFA). However, for higher shares of EFA (e.g., 5-
7%) these estimates would presumably be higher due to the intrinsic spatial restrictions of 
olive groves and farmers’ rejection to comply with EFA by maintaining some olive trees out 
of production. With regard to collective participation, the up-to-30% EU-wide bonus set in 
the EU Regulation should be carefully revised, as the monetary incentive is critical for 
promoting such participation. For instance, we have found that in general it would be 
insufficient for most of the olive growers to make them participate collectively.  
Finally, as olive growing has only two CAP levels regarding the production of 
environmental public goods (cross-compliance and AES), it would be interesting in terms of 
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AES implementation to design two different schemes representing moderate and large 
increases compared to the provision at the cross-compliance level. This approach would also 
allow olive growers to choose the alternative that most suits them, thus facilitating their 
participation in AES. However, whatever the chosen alternative, supply and demand analysis 
must be run together in order to ensure that positive social welfare gains associated with the 
implementation of this alternative are to be achieved.  
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Appendix A. Example of choice set. 
Figure A. Example of a choice set. 
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